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Le	  négationnisme	  économique.	  Et	  comment	  s’en	  débarrasser	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  lively	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The book Le négationnisme économique. Et comment s’en débarrasser by Pierre Cahuc and 
André Zylberberg has sparked a heated debate in the French press and academy. Its aim is to 
uncover the inadequacies, knowledge gaps, errors, and denials on the part of researchers and public 
actors who criticize economic science, and especially those who criticize the latter’s dominant 
current, the so-called mainstream economics. Its main targets are critical economists, particularly 
“heterodox” or “appalled economists,” but also intellectual figures from other scientific disciplines 
(Pierre Bourdieu, Michel Onfray, Dominique Méda, Axel Kahn), CEOs (Jean-Louis Beffa, Louis 
Gallois), politicians (Michel Rocard, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Barbara Romagnan), and newspapers 
(Alternatives économiques). 
A Game of Opposition 
This critique of critique adopts the strategy of the counter-example: It purports to disqualify 
the critics of economic science by highlighting in each case a finding of economic science that is 
endowed with a scientific authority presented as indisputable. For skeptics to be convinced, 
	  
however, these exemplary findings cannot rest on the theoretical assumptions of their authors (as 
is generally the case in formal theoretical models). Consequently, the book relies on the new 
experimental findings of economic science derived from the “credibility revolution,”1 forcefully 
claiming that economics has now become an “experimental science” modeled on the medical 
sciences. Just as medical researchers can determine the effectiveness of a drug—regardless of their 
prior opinion on the matter—by comparing the outcome of patients randomly allocated to two 
groups, one taking the treatment and the other a placebo, so too can economic science determine 
the validity of a theoretical mechanism and the effectiveness of an economic policy by means of an 
experimental approach which similarly compares a treated group and a control group. 
The authors mention a few experiments based on this canonical experimental approach, 
such as the Perry Preschool Program and the Moving to Opportunity experiment. However, they 
rely mainly on empirical methods—the so-called “natural experiments”—that draw on this 
approach without being able to respect all of its methodological protocol. In natural experiments, 
it is not researchers who determine and control the allocation of individuals to control and treated 
groups, but social life that produces similar situations: contiguous territories subject to different 
policies, selection thresholds distributing affected and unaffected groups on a razor’s edge, temporal 
variation in the application of a measure, etc. 
For example, the increase in the minimum wage in New Jersey, by contrast with 
Pennsylvania where it remained stable, led to a rise in employment (Chapter 1). The abolition of 
subsidized loans in 1985 in France reallocated credit in favor of the most profitable projects and 
revealed the positive impact of finance on growth (Chapter 3). The tax-free fiscal year of 1987 in 
Iceland, subsequent to the introduction of the withholding tax on income, led to an increase in 
time worked, thus showing that taxation does discourage economic activity (Chapter 4). The 
comparison of European regions on either side of the threshold for receiving European aid strongly 
nuances the notion that public expenditure favors economic development (Chapter 5). 
Throughout the five central chapters (on industrial policy, finance, taxation, public 
expenditure, and working time), the authors contradict, by means of (quasi-experimental) 
economics articles, the arguments of those who favor industrial policy, strict control of finance, 
working time reduction, or the increase in tax-financed public expenditure. The book’s vulgarizing 
approach is welcome. Moreover, its tone is rather pro-market—a point that in itself would merit 
further discussion. But the book must be evaluated in light of its primary objective, one that is 
above all epistemological: To denounce the obscurantist imposture of the critique of economic 
science and to re-establish the authority of true science. 
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  Joshua Angrist and Jörn-Steffen Pischke, “The Credibility Revolution in Empirical Economics: How Better Research 
Design is Taking the Con Out of Econometrics”, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2010, 24 (2), pp. 3-30.	  
	  
Yet beyond the oppositions regarding the merits or limits of free-market economics vs. state 
interventionism, orthodoxy vs. heterodoxy, experiments vs. theory, pluralism vs. unity, the authors 
make several questionable points that, far from stimulating scientific debate, effectively paralyze it: 
offensive connotations, poorly supported allegations of science denial, biased accusations of 
ignorance, and recourse to arguments from authority. 
The Terms in Debate 
The use of the French term “négationnisme” is not a mere editorial decision. The word 
appears 58 times in the book. Négationnisme, however, is not an ordinary concept. In law, the 
notion refers to the denial of crimes against humanity, a denial that is condemned in France by the 
Gayssot Law. While the crime against humanity is the most severely sanctioned crime, 
négationnisme is its most serious intellectual counterpart. In the social sciences, the French 
“négationnisme” (unlike the English “denialism”) is exclusively reserved for the ideological and 
complicit denial of mass massacres.2 In addition to legal references, a Google Scholar query for this 
keyword mainly returns references to the denial of the Jewish genocide, as well as some references 
to the denial of the Rwandan and Armenian genocides, massacres by Japanese troops, colonial 
crimes, or the repression of 17 October 1961 in France. The authors do not ignore that fact, and 
the reader is warned from the first pages: The phenomenon about to be denounced will be very 
different. Négationnisme is redefined as the denial of abundantly documented scientific knowledge 
(p. 6). 
Yet the terms of natural language, unlike those of mathematical language, cannot be 
redefined with the wave of a magic wand. The denotation may change, but the connotation 
remains. It hurts, it demeans, it offends. And yet, the French language includes words that allow 
for designating the phenomenon criticized in the book without mobilizing the opprobrium linked 
to mass massacres: for instance, economic negation or denegation. One could also invent, on the 
model of “climate skepticism,” neologisms such as “science skepticism” or “economic skepticism.” 
Are the texts and ideas being criticized the mark of an economic skepticism similar to 
climate skepticism or creationism, which unfortunately pollute public debate to the detriment of 
true scientific knowledge? The accusation of science skepticism is serious and should not be 
formulated lightly. It implies specific conditions, such as common knowledge, a very broad 
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  Thus, Robert Proctor uses the English term denialism in his book on tobacco. See Robert Proctor, Golden Holocaust: 
Origins of the Cigarette Catastrophe and the Case for Abolition, University of California Press, 2011. This term was 
mistakenly translated as négationnisme in the French version. 
	  
knowledge, but also deniers who deny, dissimulate, or distort such knowledge and its evidence with 
arguments that are truncated or made in bad faith, who do not publish on these issues in established 
scientific outlets, and who are very widely recognized among specialists as fake scientists, etc. The 
additional difficulty, if one adopts the perspective of the science historian Thomas Kuhn, is that 
researchers who challenge the dominant paradigm during an episode of scientific revolution can be 
regarded as science skeptics. The line is difficult to draw between the inspired methodical doubt of 
the revolutionary genius and the pathological doubt of the ideologue. 
The Crime of Ignorance 
The book, however, does not generally meet the conditions for making this accusation. It 
fails to highlight, in the writings targeted for criticism, blatant denials of solidly established and 
consensual scientific findings. The alleged offenses, as evidenced by quotations taken mostly from 
interviews and essays aimed at the general public, and not from more nuanced and documented 
academic works, are at worst either abusive generalizations or crimes of ignorance. Those who 
overlook this or that economics article regarded as important by the authors are accused of 
economic skepticism. To ignore scientific works is certainly regrettable, but it is the most common 
aspect of scientific life. In any given scientific field, hundreds of texts are published every day, and 
it is cognitively impossible to master all the information. A scientist will always ignore a text that 
another will consider important. This is eminently reversible—and, unsurprisingly, the book has 
been criticized in particular for its ignorance in matters of epistemology.3 In addition, an empirical 
finding is valid only under the assumption that the studied phenomenon is adequately measured. 
An article can be overlooked because it has failed to convince some readers due to the measure’s 
limitations, even as it has convinced others. Rational discussion serves to determine the scope and 
limitations of articles without the need for anathemas. 
Finally, to justify their very personal selection of empirical studies that allow them to 
contradict the critique of economics, the authors do not hesitate to supplement their argumentation 
with the most external hierarchical symbols of scientific reputation: classification of journals, 
impact factor, researchers ranking, John Bates Clark medal, Nobel Prize. The point is not to deny 
any informative value to such signs, but to recall that if they are needed to gain adherence, then 
they function as arguments from authority. One should be able to convince in a rational debate 
without resorting to this. 
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September 2016.	  
The Challenge Of and To the 35-Hour Workweek 
The pages on the “35-hour workweek” illustrate these four limitations. The accusations 
against those who defend the job-creating effects of working time reduction are out of hand (“They 
are completely lost in economic denialism,” p. 74). Here, however, the consensus among specialists 
on the issue is rather that the 35-Hour Workweek laws did create jobs, even if uncertainty remains 
as to the underlying mechanisms (pure working time reduction, reorganization of work, wage 
moderation, or decrease in compensation costs). These conclusions are based on scientific articles 
that use methods comparing treated and control groups that are thoroughly consistent with those 
promoted in the book. They are credible provided, as always, that the measurement assumptions 
are met (in this case the absence of selection bias). 
Faced with these studies, the book Le négationnisme économique brandishes a similar type of 
article comparing the departments of Alsace-Moselle (treated group), where working time 
reduction was found to be lower given the possibility of including two local holidays in the count, 
to the rest of France (control group).4 This last article, which had the advantage of subtracting the
effects of the decrease in compensation costs, showed that working time reduction does not create 
jobs. But it remained cautious, its finding being valid, here again, only so long as measurement 
assumptions (i.e., absence of unobserved heterogeneity5) were actually verified. In fact, it was
criticized precisely on this point, a criticism that was ignored in the book. In order to reinforce the 
authority of this article and make its omission seem even more culpable, the authors do not hesitate 
to mention its publication in “academic journals worthy of the name” (p.73), suggesting, perhaps, 
the indignity of the journals that published the previous studies. 
Yet, it turns out that the findings of this article—as often happens in science—suffer from 
two flaws6: erroneous computer coding and failure to take into account the impact on working time
of cross-border workers (who are numerous in Alsace-Moselle). The correction of these errors 
yields far less convergent and convincing results, the significance of which is currently under 
discussion.7 In retrospect, while the authors may be right that there is no impact of the 35-hour
4	  Matthieu Chemin and Étienne Wasmer, “Using Alsace Moselle Local Laws to Build a Difference in Differences 
Estimation Strategy of the Employment Effects of the 35 Hour Workweek Regulation in France,” Journal of Labor 
Economists, 2009, 27 (4), pp. 487-524.  5	  To determine the impact of working time reduction on employment, the article hypothesizes that the model has taken 
into account all factors in the differentiated evolution of the two geographical areas, and that the differences observed 
cannot be attributed to other unobserved variables. 	  6	  Olivier Godechot, “L’Alsace-Moselle peut-elle décider des 35 heures?” Notes et documents de l’OSC, 2016-04, 2016 
and “Can We Use Alsace-Moselle for Estimating the Employment Effects of the 35-Hour Workweek Regulation in 
France?”, Mimeo. 7 	  See Matthieu Chemin and Étienne Wasmer, “Réponse à ‘L’Alsace-Moselle peut-elle décider des 35 
heures?’”  Miméo, 2016.  
workweek once the decrease in compensation costs has been accounted for, they are very imprudent 
in making believe that science has definitively settled the question. Thus, the culpable ignorance of 
researchers, journalists, and deputies who discuss the effects of working time reduction without 
taking this study into account appears less severe. 
This discussion can be read as a plea for academic caution and courtesy, which are often 
dull, formulaic, and also hypocritical when one considers the intensity of underlying convictions. 
Yet, this mode of expression serves a function: It is that which best allows for the rational evaluation 
of arguments in a scientific debate. 
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